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Abstract. We introduce ATLEA, a novel extension of Alternating-time Temporal
Logic with explicit actions in the object language. ATLEA allows to reason about
abilities of agents under commitments to play certain actions. Pre- and postcon-
ditions as well as availability and unavailability of actions can be expressed. We
show that the multiagent extension of Reiter’s solution to the frame problem can
be encoded into ATLEA. We also consider an epistemic extension of ATLEA.
We demonstrate that the resulting logic is sufficiently expressive to reason about
uniform choices of actions. Complexity results for the satisfiability problem of
ATLEA and its epistemic extension are given in the paper.
1 Introduction
Several formalisms for reasoning about actions were suggested in AI, including situ-
ation calculus [19], event calculus [20], fluent calculus [21,22], and so-called action
languages such as A and C [9,14]. These formalisms provide languages to describe ac-
tions in terms of pre- and postconditions. We are interested in reasoning about actions
within the framework of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [2], a logic for rea-
soning about strategic abilities. In ATL there are no names for actions and there is no
obvious way to describe the behaviour of actions. We therefore extend ATL to ATLEA:
ATL with Explicit Actions in the object language. We demonstrate that the resulting
logic allows to reason about multiagent actions. In particular, we show that ATLEA
allows us to specify the pre- and post-conditions of actions and to check whether in
a given situation an agent or coalition of agents has the capability to ensure a given
outcome.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces ATLEA, and Section 3 il-
lustrates how pre- and postconditions of actions can be specified. We then consider an
epistemic extension of ATLEA and demonstrate that it is sufficiently expressive to rea-
son about the conditions under which an agent has a uniform choice to ensure a given
state of affairs (Section 4).
2 ATL with Explicit Actions
An action commitment is a pair (a, ω) consisting of an agent a and an action name
ω, also written a 7→ ω: a is committed to perform ω at the current state. An action
commitment function is a finite set ρ of action commitments such that ρ is a partial
function in its first argument: for every two (a, ω) and (a, ω′) in ρ we have ω = ω′.
We write ρ(a) = ω if (a, ω) ∈ ρ; otherwise we say that ρ(a) is undefined. The partial
function ρ describes the commitments of the agents a in dom(ρ) to play action ρ(a) at
the current state.
Action commitment functions parameterise ATL path quantifiers. A formula of the
form 〈〈A〉〉ρψ is read: “while the agents in dom(ρ) perform the actions as specified in
ρ, the agents in A have a strategy to ensure the temporal property ψ, no matter what
the agents in Σ \ A do.” Just as in ATL, there is an existential quantification over the
strategies of the agents in coalition A and a universal quantification over the strategies
of the agents outside of A. The selection of strategies occurs simultaneously, without
interdependencies between the agents. The novel part in ATLEA is that we only quantify
over strategies respecting ρ. Note that in the path quantifier 〈〈A〉〉ρ , the function ρ may
commit both members of the coalition A (the proponents) and its opponents outside
A. A special case is when ρ = ∅: then 〈〈A〉〉ρ is nothing but the ATL operator 〈〈A〉〉.
For example, the formula 〈〈a, c〉〉{a7→ωa,b7→ωb}ψ holds at a state w if, and only if, there
is a strategy for coalition {a, c} where a performs ωa at w, such that for all strategies
for Σ \ {a, c} where b performs ωb at w, all paths resulting from the chosen strategies
satisfy the temporal property ψ.
We fix a setΠ of atomic propositions, a setΣ of agents, and a setΩ of action names.
We assume that these three sets are countably infinite and disjoint.1 The language of
ATLEA is defined over the signature 〈Π,Σ,Ω〉.
Definition 1 (ATLEA syntax). The following grammar defines state formulas ϕ and
path formulas ψ:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ρψ
ψ ::= ¬ψ | ©ϕ | ϕU ϕ
where p ranges over Π , A ranges over finite subsets of Σ and ρ ranges over action
commitment functions with action names from Ω. The language of ATLEA consists of
state formulas.
We sometimes omit set parentheses as in 〈〈a〉〉a 7→ω©ϕ. For state formulas, the
Boolean operators ∧, →, ↔, and the logical constants ⊤ and ⊥ are defined as usual by
means of ¬ and ∨. The commonly used temporal operators ‘sometime’ and ‘forever’
are defined as the path formulas✸ϕ = (⊤U ϕ) and ✷ϕ = ¬(⊤U ¬ϕ), respectively.
Formulas are evaluated on concurrent game structures that additionally interpret ac-
tion names as moves of players.
Definition 2 (CGSN). Let S = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ Σ, n ≥ 1, be a finite set of agents,
P ⊂ Π a finite set of atomic propositions, and O ⊂ Ω be a finite set of action names.
A Concurrent Game Structure with action Names (CGSN) C for the signature 〈S, P,O〉
is a tuple C = 〈W,V,M,Mov,E, || · ||〉, where:
– W is a finite, non-empty set of worlds (alias states);
– V :W −→ 2P is a valuation function;
– M is a finite, non-empty set of moves;
1 Infinite signatures are relevant for the analysis of the complexity of the satisfiability problem.
– Mov : W × S −→ 2M \ ∅ maps a world w and an agent a to the non-empty set
Mov(w, a) of moves available to a at w;
– E : W × MS −→ W is a transition function mapping a world w and a move
profile m = 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 (one move for each agent) to the world E(w,m);
– || · || : O −→ M is a denotation function mapping action names in O to moves
in M .
CGSNs are finite objects. We obtain infinitely many classes of CGSNs, one per signa-
ture. In a CGSN, an action name is interpreted as a move (which may interpret several
action names). Mov(w, a) determines which of the moves from M are available to
a at state w. We say that action ωa is available to agent a at w if ||ωa|| = ma and
ma∈Mov(w, a).
A strategy for an agent a is a function fa that maps every worldw to a move fa(w) ∈
Mov(w, a) available to a at w.2 A strategy for a coalition A ⊆ S is a function FA
that maps every agent a fromA to a strategy FA(a) for a. Given an action commitment
function ρ, a strategyFA forA is called compatible with ρ atw if for all a ∈ A∩dom(ρ),
FA(a)(w) = ||ρ(a)||.
Clearly, when A ∩ dom(ρ) = ∅ then any strategy FA for coalition A is compatible
with ρ. We denote with strat(A, ρ, w) the set of all strategies for A that are compatible
with ρ at w. When the interpretation of agent a’s commitment is not among the moves
available atw, i.e., when ||ρ(a)|| /∈Mov(w, a), then no strategy for a is compatible with
ρ at w. This holds more generally for coalitions containing a: if ||ρ(a)|| /∈ Mov(w, a)
for some a ∈ A then strat(A, ρ, w)=∅.
A move profile is used to determine a successor of a state using the transition func-
tion E. We define the set of available move profiles at state w as follows:
prof(w) = {〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 | mi ∈Mov(w, i)}.
The set of possible successors of w is the set of states E(w,m) where m ranges over
prof(w). An infinite sequence λ = x0x1x2 · · · of worlds from W is called a computa-
tion if xi+1 is a successor of xi for all positions i ≥ 0. λ[i] denotes the i-th component
xi in λ, and with λ[0, i] the initial sequence x0 · · ·xi of λ.
The set out(w,FA) of outcomes of a strategy FA for A starting at a world w is the
set of all computations λ = x0x1x2 · · · such that x0 = w and, for every i ≥ 0, there is
a move profile m = 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 ∈ prof(xi) such that:
– ma = FA(a)(xi), for all a ∈ A; and
– xi+1 = E(xi,m).
A strategy FS for all agents in the signature specifies exactly one play: out(w,FS)
is a singleton. A CGSN C for 〈S, P,O〉 allows to interpret an ATLEA formula ϕ if S
contains all agents, P all atomic propositions, and O all action names occurring in ϕ.
The satisfaction relation is defined as follows:3
2 The logic is defined for memoryless strategies. The extension to perfect recall strategies is
straightforward.
3 We skip the cases for atomic propositions, Boolean and temporal operators; they are defined
as in ATL [2].
C, w |= 〈〈A〉〉ρψ iff there exists FA ∈ strat(A, ρ, w) such that
for all FS\A ∈ strat(S\A, ρ, w) it holds that
C, λ |= ψ, where {λ} = out(w,FA∪FS\A).
Validity and satisfiability are defined as expected: ϕ is valid if C, w |= ϕ for every state
w of every CGSN C whose signature contains that of ϕ; ϕ is satisfiable if ¬ϕ is not
valid.
With ATLEA we can express the (un-)availability of actions. A formula of the form
〈〈a〉〉a7→ωa©⊤ states that action ωa is available to agent a at the current state. More
generally, we have that C, w |= 〈〈A〉〉ρ©⊤ iff ||ρ(a)|| ∈ Mov(w, a) for all a ∈ A ∩
dom(ρ). The other way round, to express the unavailability of ωa to a, we have that
C, w |= ¬〈〈A〉〉ρ©⊤ iff there is an a ∈ dom(ρ) ∩A such that ||ρ(a)|| /∈Mov(w, a).
ATL is the fragment of ATLEA where every action commitment function is empty.4
Without commitments ATLEA formulas can be interpreted in CGSNs with empty de-
notation functions, which are essentially concurrent game structures as used in ATL.
A crucial difference to ATL, however, is the fact that ATLEA can detect the differ-
ence between memoryless and perfect recall strategies. Consider a CGSN for one agent
with two states x and y such that p ∈ V (x) but p /∈ V (y), Mov(x, a) = {1, 2} and
Mov(y, a) = {1}, x = E(x, 1), y = E(x, 2) = E(y, 1), and ||ω|| = 1. The formula
〈〈a〉〉a7→ω©p ∧ 〈〈a〉〉a 7→ω(⊤U ¬p) is false at a state x under memoryless strategies, but
it holds for strategies that allow a recall of at least one predecessor.
The proposition below illustrates that the status of some ATLEA counterparts of ATL
axioms [12] depends on the interplay of the two arguments in the ATLEA operator
〈〈A〉〉ρ.
Proposition 1. The following formulas are ATLEA valid.
1. 〈〈A〉〉ρ©⊤ for dom(ρ) ∩ A empty
2. ¬〈〈A〉〉ρ©⊥ for dom(ρ) \A empty
3. (〈〈A〉〉ρ©ϕ ∧ 〈〈B〉〉ρ©ψ) → 〈〈A ∪B〉〉ρ©(ϕ ∧ ψ) for A ∩B ⊆ dom(ρ)
4. 〈〈A〉〉ρ©ϕ→ 〈〈A〉〉ρ′©ϕ for ρ′ = ρ ∪ {a 7→ ω}, a /∈ A
5. 〈〈A〉〉ρ′©ϕ→ 〈〈A〉〉ρ©ϕ for ρ′ = ρ ∪ {a 7→ ω}, a ∈ A
6. 〈〈A ∪ {a}〉〉ρ©ϕ→ 〈〈A〉〉ρ©ϕ for a ∈ dom(ρ)
7. 〈〈A〉〉ρ(ϕU ψ)↔ ((ψ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉ρ©⊤) ∨ (ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉ρ©〈〈A〉〉∅(ϕU ψ)))
Item 1 generalises the ATL axiom (⊤) (obtained when ρ is empty). Another particular
case is whenA is empty: then both 〈〈∅〉〉ρ©⊤ is valid. Item 2 generalises the ATL axiom
(⊥) (obtained when ρ is empty). To see that Item 1 is invalid when dom(ρ) and A are
not disjoint, suppose a ∈ dom(ρ) ∩ A: then we can always find a CGSN C and a state
w such that ||ρ(a)|| /∈ Mov(w, a), and then C, w 6|= 〈〈A〉〉ρ©⊤. Item 3 generalises
ATL’s superadditivity axiom (S), relaxing the constraint of disjointness of A and B.
Intuitively it says that when the actions of the agents that are in both, A and B, are
fixed by ρ then these agents cannot have different strategies to enforce ϕ and ψ. For
that reason, the powers of the two coalitions can be combined. Consider the case where
4 We note in passing: ATL does not allow for negated path formulas, while ATLEA does
(cf. Def. 1).
A ⊆ dom(ρ). It then follows from the monotony of 〈〈A〉〉ρ and our superadditivity
axiom (Item 3) that 〈〈A〉〉ρ is a normal modal box operator. Items 4 and 5 are respectively
about increasing commitment of opponents and releasing commitment of proponents.
Item 6 is about dismissing committed proponents. Item 7 is a fixpoint axiom of ATL.
It allows to rewrite formulas in a way such that ρ is empty in all modal operators of
the form 〈〈A〉〉ρ(ϕU ψ).5 Moreover, the generalisations of the ATL inference rules of
Modus Ponens and Necessitation all preserve validity. However, we leave a complete
axiomatisation of ATLEA for future work.
Remark 1. As an extension of ATLEA, we may consider PDL program operators such
as sequential composition, iteration and test over action descriptions. For the one-agent
case, this is related to CTL with Path Relativisation [15]. It would also be interesting to
study complements of actions, as well as the loop construct, which allows to formulate
action commitments of the form a 7→ ω∞ stating that a plays the action denoted with
ω at all states. We can also view a 7→ ω∞ as a commitment of a to play ω in all
situations. In other words, ω∞ is a strategy. This means that we can specify entire
(memoryless) strategies within such an extension of ATLEA. This motivates a study of
the relationships between the extension of ATLEA and other logics with representations
of strategies in the object language such as ATLES [28] and Strategy Logic [6], which
we leave for furture work. The equivalence in Item 7 of Proposition 1 becomes invalid if
we generalise commitments from atomic actions to sequences of actions. The extension
of ATLEA by the program operators of PDL is subject of ongoing work.
Theorem 1. The satisfiability problem for ATLEA is ExpTime-complete.
The ExpTime lower bound carries over from the fragment ATL [29]. The matching
upper complexity bound can be shown by adapting the decision procedure for ATL [29],
which is a type elimination constructions inspired from [8].
3 Reasoning about Actions
We now put ATLEA to work and demonstrate its usefulness in reasoning about mul-
tiagent actions. We start by encoding in ATLEA Reiter’s action descriptions in terms
of complete conditions for the executability and the effects of actions. We build on the
mapping of Reiter’s solution to the frame problem into dynamic epistemic logics with
assignments as done in [7]. We take the multiagent context into account by integrat-
ing ideas stemming from logics of propositional control. There, the set of propositional
variables is partitioned among the agents, and an agent controlling a variable is the only
one able to change its truth value [26].
5 We note that ATL’sS-maximality axiom ¬〈〈S〉〉∅©¬ψ ↔ 〈〈∅〉〉∅©ψ (which relates the empty
coalition with the set of all agents) does not make sense in our setting: as formulas ϕ are
evaluated in CGSNs whose signature contains that of ϕ, there is no way of ‘grasping’ the set
of all agents S of a given model. Our ATLEA (and also the underlying version of ATL) is more
general than ATL as defined in [12]. The latter is actually a family of logics: each member of
the family is defined for a finite set of agents, yielding uncountably many axiomatisations.
3.1 Action Descriptions
Let 〈S, P,O〉 be a finite signature. Let Φ be the set of propositional formulas over P .
An action description for 〈S, P,O〉 is a tuple T = 〈agt, poss, eff〉 where
– agt : O −→ S associates to each action name ω an agent agtω;
– poss : O −→ Φ associates to each action name ω a propositional formula possω
such that for every agent a,
∨
ω|agtω=a
possω is valid in propositional logic;
– eff : O −→ P −→ Φ is a mapping associating to each action name ω a partial func-
tion effω : P −→ Φ, such that if possω1 and possω2 are satisfiable in propositional
logic and agtω1 6= agtω2 then the domains of effω1 and effω2 are disjoint.
The function agt associates actions to agents who can perform them. No two agents
have the same action. The propositional formula possω characterises the conditions
under which ω is executable by agtω; the constraint says that at every state, each agent
has at least one action that is executable. The intuition of the function eff is that when
effω is defined for p then one of the things ω does is to assign to p the truth value of
effω(p): if ϕ is true before ω then p is true after ω, and if ϕ is false before ω then p is
false after ω. When effω is undefined for p then ω leaves the truth value of p unchanged.
The disjointness constraint guarantees that there is no state where two different agents
have executable actions changing the truth value of p. This is more liberal a condition
than exclusive control6 that is common in logics of propositional control [26,10]. We
call ours local exclusive control.
Example 1. Consider a light that is controlled by two switches. The position of these
switches is described by two propositional variables; moreover, there are variables de-
scribing whether agent a is close to switch k or not: P = {up1, up2} ∪ {closea,k |
a, k ∈ {1, 2}}. The light is on if the switches are either both up (up1 ∧ up2) or both
down (¬up1 ∧ ¬up2); in other words, the light is on if and only if up1 ↔ up2. There
are two agents: S = {1, 2}. Each agent a can toggle each switch k (togglea,k) or do
nothing: O = {togglea,k | a, k ∈ {1, 2}} ∪ {nopa | a ∈ {1, 2}}. Therefore the action
description T = 〈agt, poss, eff〉 is as follows.
– agttogglea,k = agtnopa = a, for all agents a and switches k;
– posstogglea,k = closea,k ∧ ¬closea′,k, for agents a 6= a
′ (in order to flip a switch
the agent has to be the only one close to it);
– possnopa = ⊤;
– effnopa is undefined for all p ∈ P (the action nopa does not change any variable);
– efftogglea,k is defined for upk, and efftogglea,k(upk) = ¬upk.
Observe that the function eff obeys our constraints on action descriptions: for the con-
junction posstoggle
1,1
∧ posstoggle
2,2
to be propositionally satisfiable, the domains of eff,
dom(efftoggle
1,1
) = {up1} and dom(efftoggle
2,2
) = {up2}, have to be disjoint, which is
indeed the case.
6 According to [10], control is exclusive when agt
ω1
6= agt
ω2
implies that the domains
dom(effω1) and dom(effω2) are disjoint, whatever possω1 and possω2 are. (We have adapted
the notation.)
Action descriptions are an economic description of a domain and ‘count as a solution
to the frame problem’ [19]: the descriptions only talk about what changes and do not
contain frame axioms. A given T = 〈agt, poss, eff〉 determines what Reiter calls a
successor state axiom for each p ∈ P ; in the situation calculus this takes the following
form:
p(do(x, s)) ↔
( ∨
ω|p∈dom(effω)
(x = ω ∧ effω(p))
)
∨
(
p(s) ∧ ¬
∨
ω|p∈dom(effω)
x = ω
)
where x is an action variable and s is a situation variable, both universally quantified. It
says that action x makes p true iff either x is an action whose precondition for making
p true holds, or p was true before and x is not an action changing p.
3.2 CGSNs for T
We now associate concurrent game structures with action names to a given action de-
scription.
Let 〈S, P,O〉 be a signature. Let T = 〈agt, poss, eff〉 be an action description and
let C = 〈W,V,M,Mov,E, || · ||〉 be CGSN. C is a CGSN for T iff:
– M = O;
– Mov(w, a) = {ω ∈ O | agtω = a & V (w) |= possω};
– V (E(w,m)) =
{p | ∃i ∈ S, effmi defined for p & V (w) |= effmi(p)} ∪
{p | p ∈ V (w) & ∀i ∈ S, effmi undefined for p};
– ||ω|| = ω.
In the clause for Mov, the condition V (w) |= possω has to be understood as truth of
possω in the propositional interpretation V (w). Note that the clause for E corresponds
to Reiter’s successor state axiom.
A state formula ϕ of the language of ATLEA is valid in the class of CGSNs for T iff
C, w |= ϕ for every state w of every CGSNs C for T whose signature contains that of
ϕ. Moreover, ϕ is satisfiable in a CGSN for T iff ¬ϕ is not satisfiable.
We can now formulate two important problems in reasoning about actions. Suppose
given a signature 〈S, P,O〉, an action description T , a formula describing the initial
state ϕi and a formula describing the goal state ϕg . The prediction problem for a se-
quence of multiagent actions ρ1,. . . , ρn is to decide whether it the case that
ϕi → 〈〈dom(ρ1)〉〉ρ1©· · · 〈〈dom(ρn)〉〉ρn©ϕg
is valid in the class of CGSNs for T ; the planning problem for a set of agents A is to
decide whether it the case that
ϕi → 〈〈A〉〉∅✸ϕg
is valid in the class of CGSNs for T .
Example 2. Let us take up Example 1. Whether
(close1,1∧¬close2,1∧close2,2∧¬close1,2∧up1∧¬up2) →
〈〈1, 2〉〉17→nop1,27→toggle2,2©(up1 ↔ up2)
is valid in the CGSNs for T is a prediction problem. Whether
(close1,1 ∧ ¬close2,1 ∧ close2,2 ∧ ¬close1,2)→
〈〈1, 2〉〉∅©(up1 ↔ up2)
is valid in the CGSNs for T is a planning problem. Both implications are valid in the
class of CGSNs for T .
3.3 Reduction to ATLEA Satisfiability
We now show that for finite signatures, satisfiability in a CGSN for T can be reduced
to ATLEA satisfiability.
Proposition 2. Let 〈S, P,O〉 be a finite signature. Let T be an action description in
〈S, P,O〉 and let ϕ be a formula in 〈S, P,O〉. ϕ is satisfiable in a CGSN for T iff
ϕ ∧ 〈〈∅〉〉✷(
∧
Γ ) is ATLEA satisfiable, where Γ collects the following sets of formulas,
for every a ∈ S, p ∈ P , and ω ∈ O:
1. possω ↔ 〈〈agtω〉〉agtω 7→ω©⊤
2. effω(p) → 〈〈∅〉〉agtω 7→ω©p, for p ∈ dom(effω)
3. ¬effω(p)→ 〈〈∅〉〉agtω 7→ω©¬p, for p ∈ dom(effω)
4.
(∧
ω|p∈dom(effω)
¬possω
)
→ (p→ 〈〈∅〉〉∅©p)
5.
(∧
ω|p∈dom(effω)
¬possω
)
→ (¬p→ 〈〈∅〉〉∅©¬p)
6. possω → (p→ 〈〈∅〉〉agtω 7→ω′©p) for p ∈ dom(effω) and p /∈ dom(effω′);
7. possω → (¬p→ 〈〈∅〉〉agtω 7→ω′©¬p) for p ∈ dom(effω) and p /∈ dom(effω′).
Formula 1 translates the information specified in T about the executability of ω. For-
mulas 2 and 3 translate the information about the effects of ω. The last four clauses are
about the frame axioms and basically express that those variables p for which effω is un-
defined are left unchanged by the execution of ω. Formulas 4 and 5 say that when none
of the actions changing p is executable then the truth value of p remains unchanged.
Consider formulas 6 and 7: suppose p is one of the effects of ω (p ∈ dom(effω)) and
suppose at the present state ω is executable (possω is true); then due to the local exclu-
sive control constraint on the eff function of T , at that state p can only be changed by
agtω. Therefore, when agtω performs a different action ω′ not affecting p then the truth
value of p remains unchanged, whatever the other agents do.
Observe that the cardinality of Γ is polynomial in the number of symbols in the
signature (more precisely: cubic). As the length of every formula in Γ is bound by the
cardinality of Γ (because of items 4 and 5), the length of the formula∧Γ is polynomial
in the number of symbols in the signature, too. We can therefore polynomially embed
the reasoning problems of prediction and planning into ATLEA.
4 Epistemic Extension
We now sketch an epistemic extension of ATLEA along the lines of [25]. We call our
logic Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic with Explicit Actions, ATELEA.
4.1 ATELEA
We add knowledge modalities Ka to the language, one per agent a in Σ, and as well as
common knowledge modalities CA, one per finite subset A of Σ. We read the formula
Kaϕ as “a knows that ϕ is true” and the formula CAϕ as “the agents inA have common
knowledge that ϕ is true”.
Concurrent Epistemic Game Structures with action Names CEGSNs) are of the form
C+ = 〈W,V,M,Mov,E, || · ||, {Ra}a∈S〉
where 〈W,V,M,Mov,E, || · ||〉 is a CGSN (cf. Def. 2) and where everyRa ⊆W ×W
is an equivalence relation.
Given a CEGSN C+ = 〈W,V,M,Mov,E, || · ||, {Ra}a∈S〉, the satisfaction relation
|= is defined as follows:
C+, w |= Kaϕ iff C+, v |= ϕ for all v ∈W with wRav
C+, w |= CAϕ iff C+, v |= ϕ for all v ∈W with wR+Av
where RA =
⋃
a∈ARa and where R
+
A is the transitive closure of RA. For the ATLEA
operators the definition is as before.
We can extend the decision procedure for ATLEA to allow for the epistemic oper-
ators. This is done similarly to ATEL compared to ATL [27]. We obtain the following
result.
Theorem 2. The satisfiability problem for ATELEA is ExpTime-complete.
Let us take over the concrete semantics for ATLEA given in Section 3 and con-
sider the class of CEGSNs structures induced by an action specification. Let T =
〈agt, poss, eff〉 be an action specification and C+ = 〈C, {Ra}a∈S〉 a CEGSN for a
finite signature 〈S, P,O〉. We say that C+ is a CEGSN for T if C is a CGSN for T as
defined in Section 3.2.
As the following proposition highlights, satisfiability in a CEGSN for an action spec-
ification T can be reduced to ATELEA satisfiability: satisfiability with respect to the
general class of CEGSNs.
Let dg(ϕ) be the maximal number of nestings of ATLEA operators 〈〈A〉〉ρ and
ATELEA epistemic operators Ka or CA within ϕ. Let (〈〈∅〉〉✷CA)nψ, for n ≥ 0, be
the formula where 〈〈∅〉〉✷CA is iterated n times. (So (〈〈∅〉〉✷CA)0ψ is ψ.)
Proposition 3. Let T be an action specification in the finite signature 〈S, P,O〉 and
let dg(ϕ) = n. Let ϕ be a formula of the language of ATELEA in 〈S, P,O〉. ϕ is
satisfiable in a CEGSN for T iffϕ∧(〈〈∅〉〉✷CS)n(
∧
Γ )∧(CS〈〈∅〉〉✷)n(
∧
Γ ) is ATELEA
satisfiable, where Γ is the finite set of formulas defined in Proposition 2.
The proof can be done in a way similar to that of Prop. 2.
4.2 Reasoning about Uniform Choices in ATELEA
An interesting aspect of our logic is that it allows us to express the concept of uniform
choice. Specifically, we say that agent a has a uniform choice from the finite set of
actions O to ensure that ϕ will be true in the next state when there exists an action in
O such that a knows that by choosing this action she will ensure ϕ in the next state, no
matter what the other agents will do. This can be expressed in ATELEA as follows:
UCa(O,ϕ)
def
=
∨
ω∈O
Ka〈〈{a}〉〉{a7→ω}©ϕ
UCi(O,ϕ) has to be read “agent a has a uniform choice from the finite set of actions
O to ensure ϕ in the next state”. This concept of uniform choice is closely related to
the concept of power. In fact, a given agent a’s power of achieving a certain result ϕ
involves not only a’s capability of achieving a but also a’s knowledge about this capa-
bility. For example, for a thief to have the power of opening a safe, he must know the
safe’s combination. (See [16] for a detailed analysis of the distinction between capabil-
ity and power.)
Furthermore, in ATELEA we can draw non-trivial inferences showing that, given
certain initial conditions, an agent has (or has not) a uniform choice to ensure ϕ in the
next state. Consider the following continuation of Example 1.
Example 3 (cont.). Remember that the light is on if the switches are either both up
(up1 ∧ up2) or both down (¬up1 ∧ ¬up2). Let us therefore abbreviate the equivalence
up1 ↔ up2 by lightOn . Suppose that in the initial situation agent 1 knows that the
light is off. Moreover, suppose that agent 1 knows that he is close to switch 1. Finally,
let us assume that agent 1 knows that agent 2 cannot perform the action of toggling
switch 1 or switch 2 because he is far away from both switches. In other words, agent
1 knows that agent 2 cannot interfere with his actions. Then we can prove that agent 1
has a uniform choice to ensure that the light is on in the next state. Indeed, it is easy
to show the following formula is valid in the class of CEGSN determined by the action
description T of Example 1:
(K1¬lightOn ∧ K1close1,1 ∧ K1(¬close2,1 ∧ ¬close2,2)) →
UC1({toggle1,1, toggle1,2, nop1},lightOn)
Thanks to the common knowledge operator we can generalize the previous notion
of uniform choice to coalitions of agents. It is reasonable to assume that the agents in a
coalitionA have the power to ensure a given outcomeϕ only if they can coordinate their
actions in such a way that ϕwill be true in the next state. In order to achieve this level of
coordination, the agents inA must have common knowledge that by performing a given
joint action they will together make ϕ true, that is, the agents in A must have a uniform
collective choice to ensure ϕ. Uniform collective choice can be formally expressed as
follows. Let A = {1, . . . , k}. Then:
UCA(O,ϕ)
def
=
∨
ω1,...,ωk∈O
CA〈〈A〉〉{17→ω1,...,k 7→ωk}©ϕ
UCA(O,ϕ) has to be read “coalition A has a uniform collective choice from the set of
actions O to ensure ϕ in the next state”.
Example 4 (cont.). Let us continue our running example and suppose that agents 1 and
2 have common knowledge that: (1) the light is off, and (2) agent 1 is close to switch
1 and far from switch 2 while agent 2 is close to switch 2 and far from switch 1. Then
we can prove that the coalition {1, 2} has a uniform collective choice to ensure that the
light is on in the next state. Indeed, it is easy to show that the following formula is valid
in the class of CEGSN determined by the action description T of Example 1:
(
C{1,2}¬lightOn ∧ C{1,2}(close1,1 ∧ close2,2)∧
C{1,2}(¬close1,2 ∧ ¬close2,1)
)
→ UC{1,2}(O,lightOn)
with O = {togglea,k | a, k ∈ {1, 2}} ∪ {nopa | a ∈ {1, 2}}. Furthermore, we can also
prove that if e.g. the agents do not have common knowledge whether the light is on then
there is no uniform collective choice ensuring that the light is on. That is,
(¬C{1,2}lightOn ∧ ¬C{1,2}¬lightOn)→
¬UC{1,2}(O,lightOn)
5 Related Work
Several authors have noted that while strategic logics provide an interesting abstract
formalism to reason about actions and strategies, it would nevertheless be useful to
have actions or strategies as first-class objects. This was tried for Coalition Logic (for
example by [4,13]) and for some very expressive logics that turned out to be undecidable
(for example [17,5,23]). We here only overview extensions of ATL.
Alternating-time temporal logic with Actions (ATL-A) together with its epistemic
extension was introduced in [1] to obtain a strategic logic for describing actions as well
as their interaction with knowledge, and to solve problems with previous approaches.
ATL-A corresponds to a version of ATLEA with commitment functions ρ defined over
non-deterministic composition of action names and in which any such ρ can only oc-
cur in formulas of the form 〈〈A〉〉ρ©ϕ. While we appreciate ATL-A as an interesting
contribution to incorporate actions in strategic logics, we argue that the better design
lies with ATLEA. The syntax of ATL-A is unwieldy as each alternative action for ev-
ery agent has to be mentioned in the formula. This makes it impossible to express a’s
commitment a 7→ ωa to use action ωa in ATL-A with a general (infinite) action signa-
ture; and even if we restrict the logic to a finite action signature the resulting ATL-A
formula will be huge. Abbreviations were suggested (already in [1]) for ATL-A to be
more friendly to modellers. ATL-A defines the temporal operators ‘forever’ and ‘until’
with action specifications in terms of ‘next-time’ and the respective fixpoint equation
from ATL (cf. Item 7 in Proposition 1). While coupling one-step actions with ‘next-
time’ formulas is conceptually clear, using fixpoint equations to define other temporal
operators involves an exponential blowup in formula size, which may be an issue with
reasoning complexity. Extending ATL-A to plans of actions appears to require major
changes of its semantics, whereas extending ATLEA this way requires defining what
it means for a coalitional strategy to be compatible with a complex action description
(cf. the set strat(.) in Section 2). In [1], model checking for ATL-A was studied, while
the satisfiability problem, which is relevant for synthesis and mechanism design, is not
considered.
Commitment ATL, CATL, [24] is an extension of ATL with ternary operators of the
form Ci(σi,ϕ) with the intended reading “if it were the case that agent i committed to
the strategy σi, then ϕ”. The interpretation of this operator is in terms of model updates:
Ci(σi,ϕ) is true at worldw of a given modelM if and only if ϕ holds at w of modelM ′
that results from eliminating from M all moves that are not consistent with agent i’s
strategy σi.7 The complexity of the satisfiability problem for CATL has not been stud-
ied, whereas the complexity result for ATLEA and its epistemic extension is one of our
main contributions here. There is also an important conceptual difference: the former
considers commitments to play strategies while the latter considers commitments to
play actions. From this point of view, CATL is much closer to ATL with Explicit Strate-
gies (ATLES) by [28], where ATL-path quantifiers are parameterised with commitment
functions for strategies [28], than to our ATLEA.
As for the differences between our ATLEA and Walther et al.’s ATLES, it is worth
noting that with ATLEA we can formalise the (un-)availability of actions at states
(cf. the side conditions of items 1 and 2 in Prop. 1), whereas with ATLES one can
reference and reason with existing strategies but not reason about their availability. An-
other difference is the local nature of commitments in ATLEA, i.e., commitments to
atomic actions are released after one time step (cf. Item 7 in Prop. 1).
The integration of game-theoretic concepts into the situation calculus was a subject
of recent research. Belle and Lakemeyer [3] study games in extensive form (in its im-
perfect information version), where only one agent can act per state. Consequently no
interactions have to be accounted for. They don’t have path quantifiers, which allows
them to define regression. De Giacomo, Lespe´rance and Pearce [11] have studied a
multiagent version of the situation calculus in order to reason about extensive games
where at most one agent can act at a given state. That agent is identified by a predicate
Control(a) indicating that a controls the current state. Concurrency is simulated by
interleaving. They have a (first-order) language with ATL path quantifiers. For a given
signature, the quantifier 〈〈A〉〉©ϕ is basically regressed to
(∨
a∈A
Control(a) ∧
∨
ω∈O
〈ω〉ϕ
)
∨
(∨
a/∈A
Control(a) ∧
∧
ω∈O
[ω]ϕ
)
where 〈ω〉 and [ω] are the dynamic operators of PDL. This relies on finiteness of the set
of agent and action symbols. While all these approaches do not really allow for ‘true’
concurrency, Reiter [18] had proposed to extend his solution to the frame problem to
concurrent actions. Different from us, he allows for several actions to be performed si-
multaneously by the same agent and does not assume exclusive control of propositional
variables. This comes with the problem of interacting preconditions: there are states
where two actions ω1 and ω2 with inconsistent postconditions are performed concur-
rently. This is avoided by our condition of (local) exclusive control.
7 CATL models are called Action-based Alternating Transition Systems (AATSs) and are closely
related to CGSNs.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced a variant of Alternating-time Temporal Logic that has explicit ac-
tions. The interesting aspect of our logic is that it combines ATL’s strategic reasoning
with reasoning about actions in terms of pre- and postconditions as traditionally done
in AI.
In future research, we will investigate the extension by regular expressions over ac-
tions. This will allow to talk not only about uniform choices, but also about uniform
strategies. Moreover, we intend to provide sound and complete axiomatizations both
for ATLEA and for its epistemic extension ATELEA.
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